




from the Dollar •
The battle against inflation has been the econo-
my's great success story in the 1980s. The annual
rate of ihflation, as measured bythe GNP fixed-
weighted price index, dropped from nearly dou-
ble digits in 1980 to a low of less than three
percent in 1986. Last year the inflation rate in
this index moved up a bit to four percent. Many
analysts forecast roughly this same rate of infla-
tion through the end of 1988.
Recently, however, there has been concern about
the potential for a larger acceleration in inflation.
Besides some telltale signs from various price
indexes in recent months, the economic funda-
mentals are moving in directions that also raise a
legitimate concern about higher inflation. This
Letter discusses the relationship between infla-
tion and these fundamentals, and then draws
some implications for inflation's outlook.
Oil prices and the dollar
"Supply shocks" can have an impact on the in-
flation rate because they change the level of
prices. While the economy is adjusting to the
new level, the rate of change in prices acceler-
ates or decelerates, depending on the nature of
the shock. Oil, for example, has had a significant
direct impact on price level changes because its
price is highly volatile, and it is a major input in
the productive process. Inflation was particularly
low in 1986 because of a sharp drop in world-
wide oil prices. Conversely, upward shocks from
the price of oil directly contributed nearly two
percentage points to the inflation rate in both
1974 and 1981.
The value of the dollar also has had a signifi-
cant effect on the price level. The GNP fixed-
weighted price index does not include prices of
imports, but competition from foreign-produced
goods affects the prices of domestically-produced
goods. For example, when the value of the dollar
falls, dollar prices of imports and foreign goods
competing with u.s. exports rise. This allows the
producers of exports and import substitutes in
the u.s. to raise their prices.
j
Chart 1 shows our estimates of the direc:t con-
tributions of changes in oil prices and the value
of the dollar to the U.S. inflation rate since the
early 1960s. Although food prices currently-are
"shocking" the economy, the price of oil and the
value of the dollar have been more important
than food prices in the past. In some years-
notably 1974 and 1987-the combination of
surging oil prices and a declining dollar directly
contributed more than two percentage points to
inflation. These two factors also contributed in-
directly to inflation by heightening inflationary
expectations during these periods.
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Demand pressure
However, the broad acceleration of inflation in
the 1960s and 1970s, and the deceleration of in-
flation in the 1980s, cannot be explained solely
by such supply shocks. Instead, we must look to
aggregate demand pressures, which are generally
caused by fluctuations in the growthof the stock
of money.
A level of aggregate demand that exceeds the
economy's capacity to produce causes prices to
be bid up as resource shortages develop. Labor is
the most important resource that can be in shortFRBSF
supply when aggregate demand is excessive.
Like any other price in the economy, wages ad-
just to changes in supply and demand. More-
over, because of the strong linkage between the
overall price level and total wage costs, demand
inflation largely is determined by supply and
demand conditions in the labor market.
Labor market dynamics
An overall shortage in the labor market has two
effects on the inflation rate, one direct andthe
other indirect. First, the shortage has a direct
effect on nominal wages. In general,both em~
ployers and workers ultimately are concerned
only about real wages, and negotiations over
nominal wages take into account the inflation
anticipated by both parties over the life ofthe
labor contract so that real wages are unaffected
by inflation. A shortage of labor, therefore, in-
duces employers to bid up anticipated real
wages in an attempt to attract more labor. In
other words, employers bid up nominal wages by
more than the anticipated rate of inflation.
Of course, when all producers bid up wages,
the overall level of wages rises. Increased wage
costs are thenpassed on to buyers in the form of
higher prices, and inflation tends to rise faster
than market participants originally had expected.
Because expectations fall short of actual inflation,
employers and workers revise their expectations
of future inflation upward. This is the indirect
effect of a shortage in the labor market. The in-
flationary norm against which aU current wage
negotiations are conducted. is raised so that the
same expectations for real wages prevail as be-
fore.
But this second adjustment occurs very gradu-
ally. We estimate that it takes aboutthree years
for a permanent changein the infl.ation rate to .
become fully anticipated in wage changes. Only
a few labor contracts are this long. Therefore,
contracting is only a partial reason for this slow
adjustment. Another important reason is thatthe
actions of all agents taken collectively lead to a
disappointment of original expectations.
In summary, a shortage in the labor market di-
rectly raises wages, and then prices, relativeto
the anticipated rate of inflation. Then, because
actual inflation exceeds anticipated inflation,
there is a further boost to inflation as inflationary
expectations of market participants get revised
J
upward. Actual inflation will continue to exceed
anticipated inflation so long as there is a labor
shortage associatedyvith anexcess.of a.ggregate
demand, and the resulting "wage-price spiral"
will continue to generate accelerating inflation.
Thus, the key to preventing accelerating inflation
is to prevent a labor shortage from developing in
the. first place. Moreover, because inflation is
costly (in terms oflost output and employment)
to slow down once it gains momentum, it is
helpful if policymakers can take actions to re-
duce aggregate demand pressures before labor
shortages become a serious problem. In this re-
spect, policymakers need to have a sense of the
point at which labor shortages are likely to de-
velop.
Estimating full employment
The unemployment rate below which there is a
labor shortage, and above which there is a labor
surplus, is referred to as the full employment rate
of unemployment. It is also called the "natural"
rate of unemployment because in the long run it
is the only sustainable unemployment rate. At
full employment, unemployment is only "fric-
tional" in the sense that it is due to normal job
turnover and movements into and out of the la-
bor force. Even though there still is some fric-
tional unemployment, supply and demand in the
labor market can be said to be in balance.
To obtain an estimate of this full employment
rate of unemployment, we must first estimate the
portion of total inflation that is produced by di-
rect pressure of demand in the labor market. This
I"s'calTed file "direct demand component" of in-
flation and is obtained by subtracting from the
actual inflation rate 1) the direct effect of oiI
prices, 2) the directeffect of the dollar, and 3)
the market's expected rate of inflation, which we
have estimated using a weighted three-year mov-
ing average ofpast inflation. The solid line in
Chart2 plots this direct demand component of
inflation.
Theory tells us that the .direct contribution of
demand to inflation is zero when there is neither
a shortage nor a surpliJs in the labormarket-in
other words, when the economy is at full em-
ployment. We can therefore obtain an estimate of
the full employment rate of unemployment by
plotting the civilian unemployment rate (dotted
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Moreover, the potential for supply shocks pre-
sents an additional risk. For example, although
the dollar has strengthened recently, this may be
only a temporary phenomenon. A future depreci-
ation in its value could raise the rate of inflation.
The direct effect on inflation would last only so
long as the dollar continued to depreciate. But
there is a concern that the indirect effect on in-
flationary expectations could generate a more
permanent increase in the inflation rate. With the
economy at full employment, dollar depreciation
would cause a greater rate of inflation than antic-
ipated and could set in motion a more lasting
acceleration in the wage-price spiral.
How much growth is "strong enough?" In the
last two decades, when the unemployment rate
was constant, increases in the labor force and
labor productivity generated yearly growth in
real GNP of between two and three percent.
Thus, real ,GNP growth in excess of this range
over a sustained period would push the unem-
ployment rate below its full employment level.
Given the current unemployment rate, it is im-
portant to slow real growth below the almost 4
percent average rate of the last five quarters if we
wish to avoid the danger of accelerating inflation.
inflation and the (adjusted) unemployment rate is
not perfect. This means that the estimate of the
full employment rate of unemployment is subject
to error. The true full employment rate could be
as high as 6Y2 percent or as low as 5 percent.
Estimates of various other analysts also tend to
fall within this range.
Outlook for inflation
The civilian employment rate dropped roughly
one full percentage point in 1987, and another
half point so far this year, to stand at 5.3 percent
in June. Thus, the evidence suggests that the
economy is well within the range of full employ-
ment. Real growth strong enough to push the
unemployment rate below its current level could




















component of inflation (solid line), and observing
the unemployment rate at which, on average,
there is no direct demand inflation. Chart 2 does
this with one slight adjustment. The demographic
composition of the labor force has changed over
time, thereby increasing the full employment rate
of unemployment in the 1960s and 1970s, and re-
ducing it somewhat in the 1980s. The civilian
unemployment rate has been adjusted to remove
changes in the unemployment rate that were due
to changes in the demographic composition of
the labor force.
Chart 2
Chart 2 shows a striking inverse relationship be-
tween the portion of the inflation rate associated
with directdemand pressure and the (adjusted)
civilian unemployment rate. This confirms the
hypothesis that when there is a shortage in the
labor market, demand inflation exceeds market
participants' expectations for inflation. Also,
since the measure of anticipated inflation is a
weighted average of past inflation, the observed
relationship shows that when there is a shortage
of labor, inflation tends to accelerate.
We estimate that, on average, the inflation rate
has tended to accelerate when the civilian unem-
ployment rate is less than 5% percent, and to
decelerate when the unemployment rate exceeds
that amount. However, as Chart 2 shows, the cor-
relation between the measure of direct demand
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